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Research on Coordination of Fresh Supply Chain Considering Supplier Misreporting and Consumer Return

Author

Listed:
  • Zhijun Lin

    (Business School, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Nanchang 330013, China)

  • Rui Chen

    (Business School, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Nanchang 330013, China)

  • Laijun Luo

    (School of Software Engineering, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Nanchang 330013, China)

  • Haiping Ren

    (Business School, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Nanchang 330013, China)

Abstract

Misreporting is prevalent in supply chain characterized by asymmetric information, and its impact on the supply chain is substantial and cannot be overlooked. In order to explore the impact of fresh supplier’s misreporting decisions on fresh supply chain, this paper takes the fresh supply chain with a single fresh supplier and a single e-commerce enterprise as the research object, and constructs five Stackelberg game models based on the differences of supply chain information transparency and power structure. Particularly, the effect of fresh-keeping level on the after-sales rate and market demand of the product is incorporated into the model, and the following conclusions are drawn by solving and analyzing the decision results of the different models: (1) When the supplier has the decision advantage, it will not choose to misreport. But when it loses the decision advantage, it will produce the misreporting behavior. Supplier misreporting is detrimental to the retailer and the supply chain; specifically, it can lead to lower fresh-keeping level and higher after-sales rates. (2) In the decentralized decision-making model, it is more beneficial for the supply chain that the supplier has the leading right of decision-making. In the absence of misreporting, the leader’s profit is always higher than that of the follower. When there is misreporting, even if the retailer is the dominant player, its profit is still lower than the manufacturer’s. (3) Both supply chain profit and fresh-keeping level are positively correlated with the coefficient of consumer perception of freshness and the coefficient of sensitivity to fresh-keeping technology, and are more significant under the centralized decision-making model. Furthermore, in response to supplier misreporting behavior, this paper achieves coordination in the fresh supply chain by designing a joint contract and confirms the effectiveness of this contract through an arithmetic analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhijun Lin & Rui Chen & Laijun Luo & Haiping Ren, 2024. "Research on Coordination of Fresh Supply Chain Considering Supplier Misreporting and Consumer Return," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(14), pages 1-24, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:14:p:6225-:d:1439472
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bojun Gu & Yufang Fu & Yanling Li, 2018. "Fresh-Keeping Effort and Channel Performance in a Fresh Product Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Consumers’ Returns," Mathematical Problems in Engineering, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-20, July.
    2. Susanta Kumar Indrajitsingha & Anita Kumari Sahu, 2022. "An optimising inventory model for investing preservation technologies in deteriorating products with hybrid type of price and stock dependent demand rate," International Journal of Procurement Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 15(2), pages 201-218.
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