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Rating Regulatory Mechanism Effect Promotion under the Environmental Issuance Effects: Based on the Incentive Difference Hotelling Model

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  • Hanyi Zhao

    (School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610000, China)

  • Yixiang Tian

    (School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610000, China)

  • Xiangyun Zhou

    (School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610000, China)

  • Luping Zhang

    (School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610000, China)

  • Wei Meng

    (School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610000, China)

Abstract

Issuance effects are regarded as one of the most important aspects referring to the regulatory guidelines of green corporate bond ratings. This paper developed a new incentive difference Hotelling model, considering four major factors, i.e., the direct effect of issuance, the indirect effect of issuance, the reputation of rating agencies and the regulatory penalties. In this model, how the direct effect and the indirect effect impact the dual rating mechanism and the integrated rating mechanism was discussed. Numerical experiments were conducted to explore the regulatory effects on the two defined mechanisms in different situations. The results demonstrate that under each mechanism, the direct and indirect effects of issuance indirectly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation by increasing the environmental benefit information content in the rating information, and the indirect effect has a greater impact. Moreover, it provides specific recommendations for the design of a regulatory regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanyi Zhao & Yixiang Tian & Xiangyun Zhou & Luping Zhang & Wei Meng, 2021. "Rating Regulatory Mechanism Effect Promotion under the Environmental Issuance Effects: Based on the Incentive Difference Hotelling Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(10), pages 1-19, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:10:p:5368-:d:552453
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    References listed on IDEAS

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