IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jstats/v4y2021i1p5-70d479770.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Statistical Approach to Analyzing Engineering Estimates and Bids

Author

Listed:
  • Roshanak Farshidpour

    (Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Samueli School of Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA)

  • Kiana Negoro

    (Department of Civil and Geomatics Engineering, Lyles College of Engineering, California State University, Fresno, CA 93740, USA)

  • Fariborz M. Tehrani

    (Department of Civil and Geomatics Engineering, Lyles College of Engineering, California State University, Fresno, CA 93740, USA)

Abstract

This paper introduces a methodology to assess the accuracy of engineering estimates in relation to the final project cost. The objective of this assessment is to develop a comprehensive approach towards obtaining a more reliable estimate of the project cost. This approach relies on the review of a synthesis of literature, which provides a basis for determining key components in the estimation of the capital cost of a project. A systematic review of existing data for selected projects was obtained as well. Employed data cover sampled public transportation projects to maintain existing infrastructure within selected geographical location and specified time. Enhanced analysis of existing data through statistical models was employed to indicate potential measures for prevention of errors in the estimate due to uncertainties in the time, cost, and method of construction. The comparison of results with similar findings from past research shows the effectiveness of presented methodologies and opportunities to enhance statistical analyses of bids and engineering estimates. Conclusions enable project managers to address uncertainties in the bidding process and enhance financial sustainability of projects within specific programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Roshanak Farshidpour & Kiana Negoro & Fariborz M. Tehrani, 2021. "A Statistical Approach to Analyzing Engineering Estimates and Bids," Stats, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-9, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jstats:v:4:y:2021:i:1:p:5-70:d:479770
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2571-905X/4/1/5/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2571-905X/4/1/5/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. De, Sankar & Fedenia, Mark & Triantis, Alexander J., 1996. "Effects of competition on bidder returns," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 261-282, February.
    2. Steven Tadelis, 2009. "Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 372-399, October.
    3. Michael H. Rothkopf, 1969. "A Model of Rational Competitive Bidding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(7), pages 362-373, March.
    4. Gaver, Kenneth M & Zimmerman, Jerold L, 1977. "An Analysis of Competitive Bidding on BART Contracts," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 279-295, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ronald M. Harstad, 2007. "Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?," Working Papers 0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1998. "Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 121-137.
    4. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    5. Yuen Leng Chow & Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, 2015. "Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 432-470, June.
    6. Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, 2004. "The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A Literature Review," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2004n29, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    7. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Joan Calzada, 2010. "Urban transport governance reform in Barcelona," IREA Working Papers 201009, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jun 2010.
    8. Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 2001. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525, October.
    9. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, July.
    10. Saplacan, Roxana, 2008. "Competition in electricity distribution," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 231-237, December.
    11. Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022. "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," Working Papers 1327, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. Nadia Fiorino & Emma Galli & Ilde Rizzo & Marco Valente, 2023. "Public procurement and reputation. An agent‐based model," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(4), pages 806-832, November.
    13. Finocchiaro Castro, Massimo & Guccio, Calogero & Rizzo, Ilde, 2023. "How "one-size-fits-all" public works contract does it better? An assessment of infrastructure provision in Italy," EconStor Preprints 270729, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    14. Victor Manuel Bennett, 2013. "Organization and Bargaining: Sales Process Choice at Auto Dealerships," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(9), pages 2003-2018, September.
    15. Decio Coviello & Luigi Moretti & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Paola Valbonesi, 2018. "Court Efficiency and Procurement Performance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 120(3), pages 826-858, July.
    16. Andrew F. Newman & Patrick Legros, 2011. "Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Survey," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-036, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    17. Sander Onderstal & Yang Yang, 2020. "Cheap-talk Communication in Procurement Auctions: Theory and Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-013/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Antonio Estache & Stéphane Saussier, 2014. "Public-Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 08-13, October.
    19. An, Yonghong & Tang, Xun, 2015. "Identification and Estimation of Auctions with Incomplete Contracts: A Structural Analysis of California Highway Construction Projects," MPRA Paper 62602, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Eshien Chong & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2014. "Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00512813, HAL.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jstats:v:4:y:2021:i:1:p:5-70:d:479770. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.