IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jmathe/v9y2021i14p1599-d589999.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the Hardness of Lying under Egalitarian Social Welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Carrero

    (Departamento Sistemas Informáticos y Computación, Facultad Informática, Universidad Complutense, 28040 Madrid, Spain
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Ismael Rodríguez

    (Departamento Sistemas Informáticos y Computación, Facultad Informática, Universidad Complutense, 28040 Madrid, Spain
    Instituto de Tecnologías del Conocimiento, Universidad Complutense, 28040 Madrid, Spain
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

  • Fernando Rubio

    (Departamento Sistemas Informáticos y Computación, Facultad Informática, Universidad Complutense, 28040 Madrid, Spain
    Instituto de Tecnologías del Conocimiento, Universidad Complutense, 28040 Madrid, Spain
    These authors contributed equally to this work.)

Abstract

When it comes to distributing resources among different agents, there are different objectives that can be maximized. In the case of egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the least satisfied agent. Unfortunately, this goal can lead to strategic behaviors on the part of the agents: if they lie about their utility functions, then the dealer might grant them more goods than they would be entitled to. In this work, we study the computational complexity of obtaining the optimal lie in this context. We show that although it is extremely easy to obtain the optimal lie when we do not impose any restrictions on the lies used, the problem becomes Σ 2 P -complete by imposing simple limits on the usable lies. Thus, we prove that we can easily make it hard to lie in the context of egalitarian social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Carrero & Ismael Rodríguez & Fernando Rubio, 2021. "On the Hardness of Lying under Egalitarian Social Welfare," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(14), pages 1-15, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:9:y:2021:i:14:p:1599-:d:589999
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/14/1599/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/14/1599/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maymin, Philip, 2011. "Markets are efficient if and only if P=NP," Algorithmic Finance, IOS Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1-11.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rosser, J. Barkley & Rosser, Marina V., 2023. "The Bielefeld School of economics, Post Keynesian economics, and dynamic complexity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 454-465.
    2. Wolfgang Kuhle, 2016. "An Equilibrium Model with Computationally Constrained Agents," Papers 1611.01771, arXiv.org.
    3. Philip Z. MAYMIN, 2018. "The Conventional Past, Behavioral Present, and Algorithmic Future of Risk and Finance," Finante - provocarile viitorului (Finance - Challenges of the Future), University of Craiova, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 1(20), pages 74-84, November.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:9:y:2021:i:14:p:1599-:d:589999. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.