The Mutual Impact of Suppliers’ Online Sales Channel Choices and Platform Credit Decisions for Offline Channels

This study examines the strategic decisions and profit dynamics of suppliers marketing their products through both offline and online channels, alongside online e-commerce platforms providing their own consumer credit services. We develop a model that incorporates consumer disposable income, channel preferences, and credit utility. Four supply chain scenarios are analyzed: wholesale and agency models with either private or open credit strategies. Using Stackelberg game theory, we explore suppliers’ sales model choices and the conditions under which platforms extend credit to offline channels. Our results show that increasing credit utility generally leads to higher equilibrium prices, while higher service fees compel suppliers to adjust their prices, favoring lower-cost channels. Notably, suppliers are more likely to adopt the wholesale model to secure platform credit for offline sales, especially when credit service fees or credit utility are high. Furthermore, platform credit strategies are strongly influenced by suppliers’ sales model choices: In wholesale models, platforms are more inclined to extend credit to offline channels under specific conditions of high disposable income (DPI) and credit utility, whereas in agency models, open credit strategies are only adopted when both DPI proportions and credit utility are low. This research provides new insights into how platforms can tailor credit offerings based on supplier strategies, offering a theoretical foundation for consumer credit policies in multi-channel sales environments and valuable guidance for managers in determining optimal channel strategies and credit service offerings.