Author
Listed:
- Ongee Jeong
(Department of Robotics and Mechatronics Engineering, Daegu Gyeongbuk Institute of Science & Technology (DGIST), Daegu 42988, Republic of Korea)
- Ezat Ahmadzadeh
(Department of Robotics and Mechatronics Engineering, Daegu Gyeongbuk Institute of Science & Technology (DGIST), Daegu 42988, Republic of Korea)
- Inkyu Moon
(Department of Robotics and Mechatronics Engineering, Daegu Gyeongbuk Institute of Science & Technology (DGIST), Daegu 42988, Republic of Korea
Department of Artificial Intelligence, Daegu Gyeongbuk Institute of Science & Technology (DGIST), Daegu 42988, Republic of Korea)
Abstract
In this paper, we perform neural cryptanalysis on five block ciphers: Data Encryption Standard (DES), Simplified DES (SDES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Simplified AES (SAES), and SPECK. The block ciphers are investigated on three different deep learning-based attacks, Encryption Emulation (EE), Plaintext Recovery (PR), Key Recovery (KR), and Ciphertext Classification (CC) attacks. The attacks attempt to break the block ciphers in various cases, such as different types of plaintexts (i.e., block-sized bit arrays and texts), different numbers of round functions and quantity of training data, different text encryption methods (i.e., Word-based Text Encryption (WTE) and Sentence-based Text Encryption (STE)), and different deep learning model architectures. As a result, the block ciphers can be vulnerable to EE and PR attacks using a large amount of training data, and STE can improve the strength of the block ciphers, unlike WTE, which shows almost the same classification accuracy as the plaintexts, especially in a CC attack. Moreover, especially in the KR attack, the Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)-based deep learning model shows higher average Bit Accuracy Probability than the fully connected-based deep learning model. Furthermore, the RNN-based deep learning model is more suitable than the transformer-based deep learning model in the CC attack. Besides, when the keys are the same as the plaintexts, the KR attack can perfectly break the block ciphers, even if the plaintexts are randomly generated. Additionally, we identify that DES and SPECK32/64 applying two round functions are more vulnerable than those applying the single round function by performing the KR attack with randomly generated keys and randomly generated single plaintext.
Suggested Citation
Ongee Jeong & Ezat Ahmadzadeh & Inkyu Moon, 2024.
"Comprehensive Neural Cryptanalysis on Block Ciphers Using Different Encryption Methods,"
Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(13), pages 1-24, June.
Handle:
RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:13:p:1936-:d:1420101
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