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The Anticorruption Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Corruption Beneficial Owner Rule

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  • Stuart S. Yeh

    (Department of Organizational Leadership, Policy, and Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA)

Abstract

To fight corruption, money laundering, and organized crime, a proposed APUNCAC Beneficial Owner Rule would require financial service personnel to obtain and submit certification by the true beneficial owner when covered funds are transacted in amounts exceeding USD 3000. The strategy would trap front men into false statements, create a transaction-level record of assertions by front men that can be tested by a prosecutor, eliminate loopholes that allow criminals to escape prosecution in offshore havens, not require proof of a predicate crime or the illicit nature of funds, trigger a chain of witness cooperation, fight organized crime using a domino strategy, and be accomplished via a relatively simple change in domestic laws. Analysis suggests (1) the required technology exists; (2) transaction friction would be minimal; and (3) that the implementation of the Rule is feasible and practical, both operationally and from a legal standpoint, suggesting that the proposed Rule offers a promising strategy to fight organized crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuart S. Yeh, 2023. "The Anticorruption Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Corruption Beneficial Owner Rule," Laws, MDPI, vol. 12(6), pages 1-133, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlawss:v:12:y:2023:i:6:p:86-:d:1266560
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Murray, 2016. "In the shadow of the dark twin – proving criminality in money laundering cases," Journal of Money Laundering Control, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 19(4), pages 447-458, October.
    2. Bertrand, Olivier & Ivaldi, Marc, 2006. "European Competition Policy in International Markets," IDEI Working Papers 419, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    3. Muhammad Subtain Raza & Qi Zhan & Sana Rubab, 2020. "Role of money mules in money laundering and financial crimes a discussion through case studies," Journal of Financial Crime, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 27(3), pages 911-931, June.
    4. Ioanna Hadjiyianni, 2021. "The European Union as a Global Regulatory Power†," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 243-264.
    5. Yeh Stuart S., 2021. "APUNCAC: An International Convention to Fight Corruption, Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 633-664, June.
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