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How to Extend China’s Rural Land Contracts for Another 30 Years: A Psychological Ownership Perspective

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  • Yuting Sun

    (Department of Land Management, School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China)

  • Xiangmu Jin

    (Department of Land Management, School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China)

Abstract

In China’s rural land system, the collective owns the land, and farmers, as members of the collective, can acquire land contractual management rights through land contracting. With the second round of land contracts nearing expiration, the central government has announced that the term should be extended for 30 years. This paper introduces the theory of psychological ownership to explore the implementation paths of the 30-year extension policy. The study finds that (1) farmers generally exhibit strong psychological ownership towards the contracted land. (2) The Household Contract Responsibility System satisfies the three routes for the formation of psychological ownership—control, intimate knowledge, and self-investment. As the duration of farmers’ possession of contracted land extends, their psychological ownership gradually forms and strengthens. (3) Farmers’ psychological ownership has both positive and negative effects. The 30-year extension policy must adhere to the path dependence formed by the evolution of the land contract system, comply with the institutional constraints imposed by rural land collective ownership, and simultaneously meet the practical demands posed by urban–rural integration and agricultural development. Drawing on the complex effects of farmers’ psychological ownership and considering the historical, institutional, and practical contexts of policy implementation, this study proposes the dual necessity of facilitating and restraining farmers’ psychological ownership when extending for another 30 years and offers corresponding policy suggestions. Facilitation requires empowering farmers with more stable land possession and stronger land rights. Restraint requires preventing the permanent locking of rural land allocation patterns to achieve fair and efficient land allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuting Sun & Xiangmu Jin, 2024. "How to Extend China’s Rural Land Contracts for Another 30 Years: A Psychological Ownership Perspective," Land, MDPI, vol. 13(8), pages 1-21, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlands:v:13:y:2024:i:8:p:1167-:d:1445576
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. James Kai-Sing Kung & Ying Bai, 2011. "Induced Institutional Change or Transaction Costs? The Economic Logic of Land Reallocations in Chinese Agriculture," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(10), pages 1510-1528.
    3. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, February.
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