IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jjrfmx/v18y2024i1p5-d1553599.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effect of Audit Committee on Tax Aggressiveness: French Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Ahmad Alqatan

    (Department of Business, Arab Open University, Ardiya 92400, Kuwait)

  • Safa Chemingui

    (Tunis Higher Institute of Management, Tunis 2000, Tunisia)

  • Muhammad Arslan

    (Department of Accounting, Open Polytechnic–Te Pūkenga, Lower Hutt 5011, New Zealand)

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of audit committee characteristics on the level of tax aggressiveness. Drawing on a sample of 72 French listed firms from the SBF120 index for the period from 2015 to 2022, this study measures the level of tax aggressiveness through the effective tax rate (cash ETR). The descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, variance inflation factor (VIF), and feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression were used for analysis of panel data. The findings reveal that measures of the independence of the audit committee, expertise of the audit committee, and audit committee size are significantly linked to tax aggressiveness. The findings also highlighted that the frequency of audit committee meetings is weakly linked to tax aggressiveness. The effectiveness of audit committee members can send a strong signal to the tax authorities, the shareholders, regulators, and the investors who are concerned about the risk of tax aggressiveness. This study contributes to the existing literature aimed at exploring the effect of audit committee characteristics on tax aggressiveness in a French context. This study has several implications for regulators, policymakers, and academia. It helps the policymakers and regulators in policy reforms who aim at combating aggressive tax practices in France, which is one of the primary objectives within the European Union (EU) framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmad Alqatan & Safa Chemingui & Muhammad Arslan, 2024. "Effect of Audit Committee on Tax Aggressiveness: French Evidence," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 18(1), pages 1-19, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jjrfmx:v:18:y:2024:i:1:p:5-:d:1553599
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/1911-8074/18/1/5/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/1911-8074/18/1/5/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Larcker, David F., 2012. "The incentives for tax planning," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 391-411.
    2. Chyz, James A. & Eulerich, Marc & Fligge, Benjamin & Romney, Miles A., 2023. "Codetermination and aggressive reporting: Audit committee employee representation, tax aggressiveness, and earnings management," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    3. Jiang, Haiyan & Habib, Ahsan & Hu, Baiding, 2011. "Ownership concentration, voluntary disclosures and information asymmetry in New Zealand," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 39-53.
    4. Karthik Balakrishnan & John E. Core & Rodrigo S. Verdi, 2014. "The Relation Between Reporting Quality and Financing and Investment: Evidence from Changes in Financing Capacity," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 1-36, March.
    5. Pei‐Hui Hsu & Jared A. Moore & Donald O. Neubaum, 2018. "Tax avoidance, financial experts on the audit committee, and business strategy," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(9-10), pages 1293-1321, October.
    6. Offenberg, David, 2009. "Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 66-79, February.
    7. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, December.
    8. Clive Lennox & Petro Lisowsky & Jeffrey Pittman, 2013. "Tax Aggressiveness and Accounting Fraud," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 739-778, September.
    9. Nguyen, Quang Khai, 2021. "Oversight of bank risk-taking by audit committees and Sharia committees: conventional vs Islamic banks," MPRA Paper 120998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Hanlon, Michelle & Heitzman, Shane, 2010. "A review of tax research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 127-178, December.
    11. Yahn-Shir Chen & Joseph Hsu & Mei-Ting Huang & Ping-Sen Yang, 2013. "Quality, Size and Performance of Audit Firms," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 7(5), pages 89-105.
    12. Kevin Holland, 1998. "Accounting Policy Choice: The Relationship Between Corporate Tax Burdens and Company Size," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3‐4), pages 265-288, April.
    13. Kevin Holland, 1998. "Accounting Policy Choice: The Relationship Between Corporate Tax Burdens and Company Size," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3&4), pages 265-288.
    14. Hatice Uzun & Samuel H. Szewczyk & Raj Varma, 2004. "Board Composition and Corporate Fraud," Financial Analysts Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 60(3), pages 33-43, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Asiri, Mohammed & Al-Hadi, Ahmed & Taylor, Grantley & Duong, Lien, 2020. "Is corporate tax avoidance associated with investment efficiency?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    2. Ana Isabel Martins Ribeiro & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão, 2015. "The Determinants of Effective Tax Rates: Firms’ Characteristics and Corporate Governance," FEP Working Papers 567, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    3. Belz, Thomas & von Hagen, Dominik & Steffens, Christian, 2019. "Taxes and firm size: Political cost or political power?," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-28.
    4. Kovermann, Jost & Velte, Patrick, 2019. "The impact of corporate governance on corporate tax avoidance—A literature review," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-1.
    5. Lisa Frey, 2018. "Tax certified individual auditors and effective tax rates," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 77-114, February.
    6. Ahmed Al-Hadi & Grantley Taylor & Grant Richardson, 2022. "Are corruption and corporate tax avoidance in the United States related?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 344-389, March.
    7. Roman Lanis & Grant Richardson & Grantley Taylor, 2017. "Board of Director Gender and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 577-596, September.
    8. Roman Lanis & Grant Richardson & Chelsea Liu & Ross McClure, 2019. "The Impact of Corporate Tax Avoidance on Board of Directors and CEO Reputation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(2), pages 463-498, December.
    9. Richardson, Grant & Taylor, Grantley, 2015. "Income Shifting Incentives and Tax Haven Utilization: Evidence from Multinational U.S. Firms," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 458-485.
    10. García-Meca, Emma & Ramón-Llorens, Maria-Camino & Martínez-Ferrero, Jennifer, 2021. "Are narcissistic CEOs more tax aggressive? The moderating role of internal audit committees," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 223-235.
    11. Fangjun Wang & Shuolei Xu & Junqin Sun & Charles P. Cullinan, 2020. "Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Literature Review And Research Agenda," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(4), pages 793-811, September.
    12. Taylor, Grantley & Richardson, Grant, 2014. "Incentives for corporate tax planning and reporting: Empirical evidence from Australia," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15.
    13. Paul Demeré & Michael P. Donohoe & Petro Lisowsky, 2020. "The Economic Effects of Special Purpose Entities on Corporate Tax Avoidance," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 1562-1597, September.
    14. Eulaiwi, Baban & Khalaf, Nihad Shareef & Al-Hadi, Ahmed & Duong, Lien & Taylor, Grantley, 2024. "Money laundering governance and income shifting: Evidence from Australian financial institutions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    15. Tao Chen & Sidney Leung & Lingmin Xie, 2021. "Does credit rating conservatism matter for corporate tax avoidance?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(4), pages 5681-5730, December.
    16. Juan Monterrey Mayoral & Amparo Sánchez Segura, 2015. "Planificación fiscal y Gobierno Corporativo en las empresas cotizadas españolas," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 214(3), pages 55-89, September.
    17. Tânia Menezes Montenegro, 2021. "Tax Evasion, Corporate Social Responsibility and National Governance: A Country-Level Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(20), pages 1-19, October.
    18. Baban Eulaiwi & Ahmed Al‐Hadi & Lien Duong & Keira Clark & Grantley Taylor & Brian Perrin, 2022. "Audit pricing and corporate whistleblower governance: evidence from Australian financial firms," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2339-2384, June.
    19. Wen, Wen & Cui, Huijie & Ke, Yun, 2020. "Directors with foreign experience and corporate tax avoidance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    20. Christofer Adrian & Mukesh Garg & Anh Viet Pham & Soon-Yeow Phang & Cameron Truong, 2023. "Do Natural Disasters Affect Corporate Tax Avoidance? The Case of Drought," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 105-135, August.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jjrfmx:v:18:y:2024:i:1:p:5-:d:1553599. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.