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An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms

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  • Chuansheng Wang

    (School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China)

  • Fulei Shi

    (School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China)

Abstract

In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.

Suggested Citation

  • Chuansheng Wang & Fulei Shi, 2019. "An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(15), pages 1-15, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:16:y:2019:i:15:p:2775-:d:254444
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wenke Wang & Xiaoqiong You & Kebei Liu & Yenchun Jim Wu & Daming You, 2020. "Implementation of a Multi-Agent Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy under the Chinese Dual Governance System: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(22), pages 1-21, November.
    2. Yingxia Xue & Fang Liu & Guangbin Wang & Jungang Shao, 2023. "Research on Strategy Evolution of Contractor and Resident in Construction Stage of Old Community Renovation Project," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-20, January.
    3. Ming Luo & Ruguo Fan & Yingqing Zhang & Chaoping Zhu, 2020. "Environmental Governance Cooperative Behavior among Enterprises with Reputation Effect Based on Complex Networks Evolutionary Game Model," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(5), pages 1-18, February.

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