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An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal Power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System

Author

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  • Kai Ou

    (School of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China
    CCTEG Chongqing Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd., Chongqing 400030, China)

  • Yu Shi

    (School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China)

  • Wenwen Zhou

    (School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China)

Abstract

The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Kai Ou & Yu Shi & Wenwen Zhou, 2024. "An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal Power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System," Energies, MDPI, vol. 17(3), pages 1-21, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jeners:v:17:y:2024:i:3:p:607-:d:1327401
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    References listed on IDEAS

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