The Political and Economic Results of February 2013

February saw yet another flare-up in the ongoing turf war between economic clans, first of all be¬tween Ivan Sechin’s and Arkady Dvorkovich’s groups of influence. The latest flare-up was so strong that it even spilled over into Russia’s state-owned TV channels. Thus, in one of its programs aired in February, the TV channel Russia showed some openly anti-Dvorkovich footage. Nevertheless, Dvorkovich still felt himself at ease, being in fact the main moderator speaking on behalf of those in the state apparatus who are displeased with Sechin’s desire to take the reins of yet another com¬pany in addition to Rosneft and Rosneftegaz. As far as this turf war was concerned, Putin was able to keep himself above the fray: he aptly maneuvered, alternatively criticizing representatives of one and then the other of these groups, and signing directives in their favor. The President’s policy was apparently aimed at maintaining the delicate balance of power within his inner circle. At the same time, the law-enforcement authorities increased pressure on the businesses deemed to be friendly to Dvorkovich. Also, Russia’s mass media widely reported on the anti-corruption campaign, showing a confusing mixture of anti-opposition materials and documentaries aimed against some representa¬tives of the party of power. In the process, they did their utmost to depict Putin and the power struc¬tures as objective and unbiased arbitrators. Apart from their positive PR impact, such campaigns usually have a palpably negative impact by increasing the number of conflicts within the ‘vertical of power’.