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Investment Decisions and Managerial Discipline: Evidence from the Takeover Market

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  • Ralph Scholten

Abstract

This article focuses on the relative importance of boards of directors and the hostile takeover market in disciplining managers who make poor acquisition decisions. The evidence shows a weak inverse relationship between acquisition performance and the likelihood of becoming a takeover target, but only after it becomes clear that the internal control mechanism has failed. A forced turnover of a top executive was more likely in the 1990s, the more negative the abnormal return associated with an acquisition announcement. The relationship between forced turnover and negative acquisition returns is stronger when hostile takeover activity is less intense. Hence, it appears that being disciplined for making a poor acquisition is a function more of the internal control mechanism than of the workings of the takeover market.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph Scholten, 2005. "Investment Decisions and Managerial Discipline: Evidence from the Takeover Market," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 34(2), Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:scholten05
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    Cited by:

    1. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug & Christoph Schneider, 2008. "How Preussag Became TUI: A Clinical Study of Institutional Blockholders and Restructuring in Europe," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 37(3), pages 571-598, September.
    2. Chen, I-Ju, 2014. "Financial crisis and the dynamics of corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan's listed firms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 3-28.
    3. Wenlian Gao & Lilian Ng & Qinghai Wang, 2011. "Does Corporate Headquarters Location Matter for Firm Capital Structure?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 40(1), pages 113-138, March.
    4. Romero, Hector & Fajardo, Eddy Johanna, 2015. "Incidencia del desempeño de la acción sobre los eventos de fusiones y adquisiciones en América Latina (2005-2009) [Stock performance and mergers and acquisitions: Evidence for Latin America (2005-2," MPRA Paper 69695, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Ryngaert, Michael & Scholten, Ralph, 2010. "Have changing takeover defense rules and strategies entrenched management and damaged shareholders? The case of defeated takeover bids," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 16-37, February.
    6. Oliver Henk, 2020. "Internal control through the lens of institutional work: a systematic literature review," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 239-273, September.
    7. Sharma, Vaibhav & Hsieh, Chialing, 2011. "Managerial horizons in stock financed mergers," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 152-161, May.
    8. Sandy Klasa & Mike Stegemoller, 2007. "Takeover Activity as a Response to Time‐Varying Changes in Investment Opportunity Sets: Evidence from Takeover Sequences," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 36(2), pages 1-25, July.

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