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Capital Structure and Ownership Distribution of Tender Offer Targets: An Empirical Study

Author

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  • Elias Raad
  • Robert Ryan

Abstract

This study investigates the capital and ownership structure of firms receiving tender offers. Predictions of control-driven models developed by Haris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) and value-maximizing models developed by Israel (1991, 1992) are examined. The study reports results consistent with the predictions that: 1) target firms increase leverage during control contests, 2) leverage increases are higher when the tender offer is opposed, 3) leverage increases are higher when the tender offer is unsuccessful, and 4) ownership structure is important to explaining the success of tender offers. When tested jointly with other independent variables, only capital structure is statistically significant in explaining both management's opposition and the success of a tender offer.

Suggested Citation

  • Elias Raad & Robert Ryan, 1995. "Capital Structure and Ownership Distribution of Tender Offer Targets: An Empirical Study," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(1), Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:raad95
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    Cited by:

    1. Chenxi Zhou & Jinhong Xie & Qi Wang, 2016. "Failure to Complete Cross-Border M&As: “To” vs. “From” Emerging Markets," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 47(9), pages 1077-1105, December.
    2. Mohammed Omran, 2002. "Testing for a Significant Change in the Egyptian Economy Under the Economic Reform Programme Era," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-59, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Harjeet S. Bhabra & Tong Liu & Dogan Tirtiroglu, 2008. "Capital Structure Choice in a Nascent Market: Evidence from Listed Firms in China," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 37(2), pages 341-364, June.
    4. Zhang, Jianhong & Zhou, Chaohong & Ebbers, Haico, 2011. "Completion of Chinese overseas acquisitions: Institutional perspectives and evidence," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 226-238, April.
    5. Wanyi Chen & Ning Hu & Xiangfang Zhao, 2022. "Information asymmetry, regulatory inquiry, and company mergers and acquisitions: evidence from Shenzhen Stock Exchange comment letters," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2497-2542, June.
    6. Gerritsen, Dirk F. & Weitzel, Utz, 2017. "Security analyst target prices as reference point and takeover completion," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 1-14.
    7. Darren Henry, 2005. "Directors’ Recommendations in Takeovers: An Agency and Governance Analysis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1‐2), pages 129-159, January.
    8. Arturo Bris, 1999. "Debt, Information Acquisition, and the Takeover Threat," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm110, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Aug 2000.
    9. Jianhong Zhang & Haico Ebbers, 2010. "Why Half of China’s Overseas Acquisitions Could Not Be Completed," Journal of Current Chinese Affairs - China aktuell, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 39(2), pages 101-131.
    10. Henry, Darren, 2004. "Corporate governance and ownership structure of target companies and the outcome of takeovers," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 419-444, September.
    11. Darren Henry, 2005. "Directors’ Recommendations in Takeovers: An Agency and Governance Analysis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1‐2), pages 129-159, January.

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