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Bidder Incentives for Informed Trading Before Hostile Tender Offer Announcements

Author

Listed:
  • Devra L. Golbe
  • Mary S. Schranz

Abstract

Legal constraints that require disclosure of a bid before a controlling interest is purchased give bidders an incentive to tip arbitrageurs before announcement. Because arbitrageurs are likely to have lower private tendering costs than other shareholders, tipping decreases the minimum successful bid price, which increases profits to the bidder. The incentive to leak information is negatively related to the amount of dilution the bidder anticipates, the degree to which the back-end price embeds any pre-announcement price increase arising from additional trading by arbitrageurs, and the size of the bidder's toehold. It is positively related to the private tendering costs of the pivotal share.

Suggested Citation

  • Devra L. Golbe & Mary S. Schranz, 1994. "Bidder Incentives for Informed Trading Before Hostile Tender Offer Announcements," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 23(4), Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:golbe94
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    Cited by:

    1. Igor Semenenko, 2019. "Rumor Mill and Merger Waves: Analysis of Aggregate Market Activity," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 9(2), pages 1-5.
    2. Ravid, S. Abraham & Spiegel, Matthew, 1999. "Toehold strategies, takeover laws and rival bidders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(8), pages 1219-1242, August.

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