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The benefits of bank deposit rate ceilings: new evidence on bank rates and risk in the 1920's

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  • Arthur J. Rolnick

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  • Arthur J. Rolnick, 1987. "The benefits of bank deposit rate ceilings: new evidence on bank rates and risk in the 1920's," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 11(Sum), pages 2-18.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmqr:y:1987:i:sum:p:2-18:n:v.11no.3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fuller, Wayne A. & Battese, George E., 1974. "Estimation of linear models with crossed-error structure," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 67-78, May.
    2. George J. Benston, 1964. "Interest Payments on Demand Deposits and Bank Investment Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(5), pages 431-431.
    3. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    4. Herbert L. Baer & Elijah Brewer, 1986. "Uninsured deposits as a source of market discipline: some new evidence," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 10(Sep), pages 23-31.
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    1. Arthur J. Rolnick, 1993. "Market disciplines as a regulator of bank risk," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 37, pages 96-110.
    2. Ms. Edda Zoli & Danyang Xie & Reza Vaez-Zadeh, 2002. "Modis: A Market-Oriented Deposit Insurance Scheme," IMF Working Papers 2002/207, International Monetary Fund.

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