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Global policy perspectives: central bank independence and credibility during and after a crisis

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  • Alan S. Blinder

Abstract

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  • Alan S. Blinder, 2012. "Global policy perspectives: central bank independence and credibility during and after a crisis," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 483-491.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedkpr:y:2012:p:483-491
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    File URL: http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2012/Blinder_final.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Political Pressure on Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pages 715-744, June.
    2. Buiter, Willem, 2014. "Central Banks: Powerful, Political and Unaccountable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10223, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Cem Cakmakli & Selva Demiralp, 2020. "A Dynamic Evaluation of Central Bank Credibility," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 2015, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    4. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Stephanos Papadamou & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 0. "Is There a Role for Central Bank Independence on Public Debt Dynamics?," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 0, pages 6.
    6. Viktor Koziuk, 2017. "Central Bank Independence and Financial Stability: Orthodox and Heterodox Approaches," Visnyk of the National Bank of Ukraine, National Bank of Ukraine, issue 239, pages 6-27.
    7. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Neyer, Ulrike, 2018. "Die Unabhängigkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 97, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), revised 2018.

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