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Disruptions in global financial markets: the role of public policy

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  • Michael H. Moskow

Abstract

How should public policy evolve in light of the recent series of financial crises worldwide? In this article, the author argues that market discipline must play an essential role in any future policy reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael H. Moskow, 2000. "Disruptions in global financial markets: the role of public policy," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 25(Q III), pages 2-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2000:i:qiii:p:2-8:n:v.25no.3
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    1. repec:aei:rpbook:53074 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Keywords

    Financial crises; Public policy;

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