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Can bank capital regulation work? research revisited

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  • Frederick T. Furlong

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  • Frederick T. Furlong, 1991. "Can bank capital regulation work? research revisited," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sum, pages 32-33.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfer:y:1991:i:sum:p:32-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    2. Frederick T. Furlong, 1988. "Changes in bank risk," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue mar25.
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    Cited by:

    1. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1993. "US Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles, and Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993, Volume 8, pages 319-377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1994. "Are banks dead? Or are the reports greatly exaggerated?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 18(Sum), pages 2-23.

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