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Combining bank supervision and monetary policy

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph G. Haubrich

Abstract

In the United States, the Federal Reserve has responsibility for both monetary policy and bank supervision. Other countries separate these functions to varying degrees. What lies behind this global diversity? Should a central bank be charged with conducting monetary policy and regulating banks, or does it make more sense ? both economic and political ? to keep these activities separate? The answer is not a simple yes or no. Rather, it appears that the right choice depends on a country?s prevailing conditions, including its financial system, its political environment, and the preferences of the public.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph G. Haubrich, 1996. "Combining bank supervision and monetary policy," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Nov.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcec:y:1996:i:nov
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ioannidou, Vasso P., 2005. "Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 58-85, January.
    2. Melanie S. Milo, 2007. "Integrated Financial Supervision : An Institutional Perspective for the Philippines," Finance Working Papers 22667, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    3. Schüler, Martin, 2004. "Integrated Financial Supervision in Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-35, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper & spagnolo, giancarlo, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," Working Paper Series 221, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    5. Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November.
    6. Luis Garicano & Rosa M. Lastra, 2010. "Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 597-621, September.
    7. James R. Barth & Luis G. Dopico & Daniel E. Nolle & James A. Wilcox, 2002. "Bank Safety and Soundness and the Structure of Bank Supervision: A Cross‐Country Analysis," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 3(3‐4), pages 163-188, September.
    8. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schüler, 2004. "A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 99-130, October.
    9. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-378, November.
    10. repec:cmj:journl:y:2013:i:29:gutu is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Lavinia Mihaela GUȚU & Vasile ILIE, 2013. "Banking supervision in European Union," SEA - Practical Application of Science, Romanian Foundation for Business Intelligence, Editorial Department, issue 2, pages 121-130, October.
    12. Milo, Melanie S., 2007. "Integrated Financial Supervision: an Institutional Perspective for the Philippines," Discussion Papers DP 2007-17, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    13. Pagès, H. & Santos, J., 2002. "Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preferences Laws," Working papers 91, Banque de France.
    14. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
    15. Heinemann, Friedrich & Schüler, Martin, 2002. "A Stigler View on Banking Supervision," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-66, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    16. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "How Do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-03, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    17. Franck, Raphaël & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.
    18. Diana Lima & Ioannis Lazopoulos & Vasco Gabriel, 2016. "The Effect of Financial Regulation Mandate on Inflation Bias: A Dynamic Panel Approach," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0616, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    19. Stéphanie Stolz, 2002. "Banking Supervision in Integrated Financial Markets: Implications for the EU," CESifo Working Paper Series 812, CESifo.
    20. João A. C. Santos, 1997. "Securities activities in banking conglomerates: should their location be regulated?," Working Papers (Old Series) 9704, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

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