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Bank crisis resolution and foreign-owned banks

Author

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  • Robert A. Eisenbeis
  • George G. Kaufman

Abstract

In many countries in recent years, failure to efficiently resolve large insolvent banks has come at a high cost both to taxpayers and to the countries? aggregate income. The increasing entry of foreign banks has complicated the resolution process. ; This article explores some special problems in the efficient resolution of insolvent banks raised by cross border banking, particularly weighing the costs and benefits of foreign bank entry via branches versus subsidiary banks. These problems lie primarily in the cross country differences in both the closure rule and the deposit insurance structure. ; The authors propose a four-point program for resolving insolvent institutions efficiently but note that the presence of foreign-owned banks may make adhering to these principles difficult. To mitigate these problems, the authors propose several policies: central multinational deposit insurance, a single insolvency resolution agency, and common or harmonized laws regarding insolvency resolution and enforcement. ; In the absence of such policies, the authors suggest that entry by way of subsidiaries rather than branches presents the lesser set of problems for the host country. For all forms of entry, they conclude, resolution costs can be most effectively controlled through the universal adoption of well-designed and enforced prompt corrective action policies and legal closure rules based on market values of assets and liabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2005. "Bank crisis resolution and foreign-owned banks," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 90(Q4), pages 1-18.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedaer:y:2005:i:q4:p:1-18:n:v.90no.4
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    File URL: https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/research/publications/economic-review/2005/vol90no4_eisenbeis-kaufman.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Harrison, Ian & Anderson, Steve & Twaddle, James, 2007. "Pre-positioning for effective resolution of bank failures," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 324-341, December.
    2. International Monetary Fund, 2008. "Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 2008/263, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Edward J. Kane, 2009. "Incentive Conflict in Central Bank Responses to Sectoral Turmoil in Financial Hub Countries," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Douglas D Evanoff & David S Hoelscher & George G Kaufman (ed.), Globalization And Systemic Risk, chapter 9, pages 121-144, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. DeYoung, Robert & Kowalik, Michal & Reidhill, Jack, 2013. "A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 612-627.
    5. Michel Aglietta & Laurence Scialom, 2010. "A Systemic Approach to Financial Regulation: a European Perspective," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 123, pages 31-65.
    6. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    7. Michel Aglietta & Laurence Scialom, 2009. "A systemic approach to financial regulation: a European perspective," Working Papers hal-04140865, HAL.
    8. Eisenbeis, Robert A. & Kaufman, George G., 2008. "Cross-border banking and financial stability in the EU," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 168-204, September.
    9. Mr. Tigran Poghosyan & Mr. Martin Cihak, 2009. "Distress in European Banks: An Analysis Basedon a New Dataset," IMF Working Papers 2009/009, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Christine M. Cumming & Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2010. "Resolving troubled systemically important cross-border financial institutions: is a new corporate organizational form required?," Staff Reports 457, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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    Keywords

    Bank failures;

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