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La diffusione del comportamento dovuto: una postilla alla teorica giuridica di Hayek

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  • Salvatore Spagano

Abstract

This work deals with an unresolved question left open by Hayek: which are the circumstances that lead to prefer a formalized rule to a spontaneous one? This paper suggests that spontaneous and formal rules do not cancel out each other, but are the results of two distinct approaches on just one reality, which did not catch its dynamic indivisibility. It is true that a behavioural rule survives thanks to its efficiency, but it is not true that the autopoiesis of the norm is efficient per se.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvatore Spagano, 2014. "La diffusione del comportamento dovuto: una postilla alla teorica giuridica di Hayek," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(1), pages 147-160.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:epepep:v:html10.3280/ep2014-001007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Binmore, Ken, 2001. "Evolutionary Social Theory: Reply to Robert Sugden," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(469), pages 244-248, February.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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