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The assassin and the donor as third players in the traditional deterrence game

Author

Listed:
  • Lisa J. Carlson

    (University of Idaho)

  • Raymond Dacey

    (University of Idaho)

Abstract

We develop two extensions of the traditional deterrence game to examine the influence of third players, called Assassin and Donor, upon the behavior of a Challenger. The results present the optimal behavior of Challenger when Assassin and Donor are included in the traditional deterrence game. The key result is that Challengers who back down, and thereby activate Assassin or Donor, are more prone to initiate conflict in the first place than are Challengers who escalate, and thereby avoid Assassin or Donor.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey, 2009. "The assassin and the donor as third players in the traditional deterrence game," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 15-22, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:epc:journl:v:4:y:2009:i:2:p:15-22
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    File URL: http://www.epsjournal.org.uk/index.php/EPSJ/article/view/97
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlson Lisa J. & Dacey Raymond, 2012. "A Surprising Result Encountered in Various Extensions of the Traditional Deterrence Game," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-13, October.
    2. Dacey Raymond & Carlson Lisa J, 2011. "Aspects of Peace Economics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-8, January.
    3. Carlson Lisa J & Dacey Raymond, 2010. "A Note on Second Order Probabilities in the Traditional Deterrence Game," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 153-162, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deterrence game; game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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