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Sanctions, sanctions-busting, and secondary sanctions: A game-theoretic analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Oana Secrier

    (Royal Military College of Canada,Kingston,Ontario,Canada)

  • Ugurhan Berkok

    (Royal Military College of Canada,Kingston,Ontario,Canada)

Abstract

One of the reasons why economic sanctions fail to achieve their objective is sanctions-busting—where the target country engages in transactions with third parties to counter the effect of sanctions. Sanctions-busting has not been captured by existing theoretical models of sanctions. Developed here is a game-theoretic model of the sanctions-busting game between the third party and the target by accounting for the costs and benefits for all three players in the triad. A full range of equilibria consistent with actual sanctions episodes are obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Oana Secrier & Ugurhan Berkok, 2025. "Sanctions, sanctions-busting, and secondary sanctions: A game-theoretic analysis," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 42-54, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:epc:journl:v:20:y:2025:i:1:p:42-54
    DOI: 10.15355/epsj.20.1.42
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic sanctions; sanctions-busting;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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