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Stackelberg real‐leader in an insider trading model

Author

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  • Leonard F.S. Wang
  • Ya‐Chin Wang

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to extend the work of earlier researches relating to insider trading issues in the stock market under a Cournot‐Stackelberg duopoly. Design/methodology/approach - This paper models that the competition among the insiders in the real market be Stackelberg, which reflects that for all outside and inside reasons, the position and influence of a firm may become the leader or the follower as time goes by. Findings - The paper demonstrates that when the listed company with insiders becomes the leader in the industry, the reaction functions of insiders will change as well as the parameters of the market, to signal from real and financial sides, but the amount traded by insiders remains the same; so does the degree of information revelation. In addition, for the information revealed to the public, the stock price reveals more information with Stackelberg real‐leader model than that of the Stackelberg financial‐leader model. Originality/value - The main contribution of this paper is that market makers can very well observe signals from the real side, and bringing a signal from the real side can help the stock market reveal more information, but once the signal is introduced, it may not further enhance market efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard F.S. Wang & Ya‐Chin Wang, 2010. "Stackelberg real‐leader in an insider trading model," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 27(1), pages 30-46, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:sefpps:v:27:y:2010:i:1:p:30-46
    DOI: 10.1108/10867371011022966
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J., 2007. "Market structure and insider trading," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 306-331.
    2. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J., 2006. "Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 530-551, September.
    3. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-887, August.
    4. James Dow, 2003. "Informed Trading, Investment, and Welfare," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(3), pages 439-454, July.
    5. Leonard J. Mirman & Neelam Jain, 2000. "Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(2), pages 333-353.
    6. Noe, Thomas H, 1997. "Insider Trading and the Problem of Corporate Agency," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 287-318, October.
    7. Jain, Neelam & Mirman, Leonard J., 2002. "Effects of insider trading under different market structures," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-39.
    8. Hu, Jie & Noe, Thomas H., 2001. "Insider trading and managerial incentives," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 681-716, April.
    9. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    10. Michael Manove, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 823-845.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wassim Daher & Harun Aydilek & Fida Karam & Asiye Aydilek, 2014. "Insider trading with product differentiation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(2), pages 173-201, March.
    2. Lyudmila A. Glik & Oleg L. Kritski, 2014. "Finding informed traders in futures and their inderlying assets in intraday trading," Papers 1402.6583, arXiv.org.
    3. Daher, Wassim & Karam, Fida & Mirman, Leonard J., 2012. "Insider trading with different market structures," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 143-154.
    4. Karam, Fida & Daher, Wassim, 2013. "Insider trading in a two-tier real market structure model," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 44-52.
    5. Karam, Fida & Daher, Wassim, 2013. "Insider trading in a two-tier real market structure model," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 44-52.
    6. Wassim Daher & Harun Aydilek & Elias G. Saleeby, 2020. "Insider trading with different risk attitudes," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 131(2), pages 123-147, October.

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