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Does board gender diversity affect firms’ expected risk?

Author

Listed:
  • Jodonnis Rodriguez
  • Krishnan Dandapani
  • Edward R. Lawrence

Abstract

Purpose - This study aims to explore the impact of board gender diversity on firms’ forward-looking risk, as perceived by both the firm’s management and its investors. The authors seek to understand whether the presence of female directors and the consequent enhancement of board dynamics can influence a firm’s risk profile. Design/methodology/approach - The authors use firms’ cash holdings and option implied volatility as proxies for future risk. The approach involves a rigorous analysis that accounts for potential concerns related to selection bias, endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The authors further substantiate the findings through robustness checks, including a dynamic panel system general method of moment test and a Heckman correction model. Findings - The results reveal an inverse relationship between board gender diversity and firms’ expected risk. The findings suggest that the primary driver of this risk reduction is the improvement in the group dynamics of the board that comes with increased gender diversity. This implies that gender diverse boards can significantly influence a firm’s risk management and financial performance. Research limitations/implications - The results indicate that gender diverse firms have economically and statistically significantly less expected risk and have better financial performance than firms with less board gender diversity. This has important implications for the organization of corporate boards. Practical implications - If the addition of female directors alters the risk aversion of the board, then management may be compelled to alter their investment and production decisions that, ultimately, affects firms’ profitability. In addition, the authors investigate whether changes to firm risk is due to gender differences in risk preferences or to an improvement in the group dynamics of the board. Social implications - The empirical results suggest that the effect of board gender diversity on firms’ expected risk and financial performance may be due to an improvement in the collective intelligence of the board, as a result of more gender diversity, and not due to gender differences in risk preferences. Originality/value - To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is the first to study the effect of board gender diversity on firms’ future risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Jodonnis Rodriguez & Krishnan Dandapani & Edward R. Lawrence, 2023. "Does board gender diversity affect firms’ expected risk?," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 41(2), pages 389-409, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:sefpps:sef-05-2023-0245
    DOI: 10.1108/SEF-05-2023-0245
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Board gender diversity; Group dynamics; Firm risk; Firm performance; G30; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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