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Delegation and salary information disclosure strategies of customer acquisition and retention

Author

Listed:
  • Weiting Wang
  • Yi Liao
  • Jiacan Li

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism. Design/methodology/approach - This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy. Findings - The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market. Originality/value - This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Weiting Wang & Yi Liao & Jiacan Li, 2024. "Delegation and salary information disclosure strategies of customer acquisition and retention," Nankai Business Review International, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:nbripp:nbri-03-2023-0030
    DOI: 10.1108/NBRI-03-2023-0030
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