Female directors and the cost of debt: does gender diversity in the boardroom matter to lenders?

Purpose - This paper aims to investigate the question concerning whether gender diversity in the boardroom matters to lenders or not? Design/methodology/approach - To answer this question, the authors use the data from 2009 to 2015 of all A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The authors use ordinary least squares regression and firm fixed effect regression to draw our inferences. To check and control the issue of endogeneity the authors use one-year lagged gender diversity regression, two-stage least squares regression, propensity score matching method and Heckman two-stage regression. Findings - The results suggest that the presence of female directors on the board reduces managerial opportunistic behavior and information asymmetry and, consequently, creditors’ perceptions about the probability of loan default and the cost of debt. The authors find that lenders charge 4 per cent less from borrowers that have at least one female board member than they do from borrowers with no female board members. The authors also find that the board structure (i.e. gender diversity) of government-owned firms also matters to lenders, as government-owned firms that have gender-diverse boards have a lower cost of debt (i.e. 5 per cent lower interest rate). Practical Implications - The findings have implications for individual borrowers and for regulators. For example, borrowers can get debt financing at lower rates by altering their boards’ composition (i.e. through gender diversity). From the regulatory perspective, the results support recent legislative initiatives around the world regarding female directors’ representation on boards. Originality Value - This paper makes several contributions. First, beyond the recent studies on boardroom gender, the authors investigate the relationship between gender diversity in the boardroom and the cost of debt. Second, the authors extend the literature on the association between government ownership and cost of debt by first time providing evidence that the board composition (e.g. gender diversity) of government-owned firms also matters to the lenders. The other contributions are discussed in the introduction section.