Marine tourism omnichannel coordination

Purpose - With the growing economic impact of e-commerce and the increasing trend of omnichannel mode, more considerate services can be provided to customers. This paper aims to explore the optimal practice of business strategies and enrich the research content of marine tourism omnichannel. Design/methodology/approach - This paper studies the optimal practice of bundling pricing and service effort strategies between two tourism suppliers (TSs) and a travel agent (TA) who distributes complementary products in marine tourism omnichannel considering joint efforts of both sides. This study develops five models by Stackelberg and Nash game and introduces the revenue-sharing contract. All outcomes/results are analyzed and the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses are conducted to derive more managerial implications and business insights. Findings - The main findings show that bundling price is directly proportional to inter-channel integration coefficient and service effort level coefficient, and inversely proportional to the price elasticity coefficient. TA tends to provide a higher level of service effort than TSs when TA plays a dominant role. Improving the service effort level unduly leads to a decline in profits. Moreover, TSs and TA can reach a win-win situation under the coordination mechanism and the marine tourism omnichannel can achieve the best performance. Originality/value - A novel and useful approach towards joint equilibrium decisions of bundle pricing and service efforts in marine tourism omnichannel with complementary tourism products under different operational strategies is proposed.