Asymmetric transport costs and welfare implications through a firm-delocation effect

Purpose - With the use of a two-region monopolistically competitive model, the paper primarly studies how unilateral changes in a country's intra-regional and/or inter-national transport costs affect its own and its trading partner's welfare. Moreover, by considering a three-region monopolistically competitive model that consists of an external region and two integrated regions, with the one having a location advantage with respect to the external market, the paper studies how within-country asymmetries in transport costs affect trading partner's welfare. Design/methodology/approach - This paper examines how investments in the infrastructure affect welfare in the home country and in its trading partner by primarily using a model with direction-specific intra-regional and inter-national trade costs. Moreover, it focuses on the within-country asymmetries in transportation costs and their impacts on trading partners' welfare. Findings - The first model shows that a unilateral reduction in a country's transport costs is beneficial for its domestic firms, while it hurts firms located in its trading partner country. Other findings show that an equal bilateral reduction in inter-national transport costs is a Pareto improvement, since it is beneficial for both countries. The second model shows that a reduction in intra-regional transport costs benefits the two integrated regions, while it has no impact on the welfare of the external region. Originality/value - Two monopolistically competitive models are considered, in order to study how investments in the infrastructure affect welfare in the home country and in its trading partner. Interestingly, the models sheds light on an important mechanism, that of firm-delocation effect.