The implications of the revised code of corporate governance on firm performance

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure attributes on firm performance following the revised code on corporate governance in Malaysia. The study presents a longitudinal assessment of the compliance and implications of the revised code on firm performance. Design/methodology/approach - – Two data sets consisting of before (2006) and after (2008-2010) the revised code are examined. Drawing from the largest companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (BM), the first data set contains 92 observations in the year 2006 while the second data set comprises of 282 observations drawn from the largest companies listed on BM over a three-year period, from 2008-2010. Both accounting (return on assets and return on equity) and market performance (Tobin’sQ) measures were used to measure firm performance. Multiple and panel data regression analyses were adopted to analyze the data. Findings - – The study shows that there were still cases of non-compliance to the basic requirements of the code such as the one-third independent non-executive director (INDs) requirement even after the revised code. While the regression models indicate marginal significance of board size and independent directors before the revised code, the results indicate all corporate governance variables have a significant negative relationship with at least one of the measures of corporate performance. Independent chairperson, however, showed a consistent positive impact on firm performance both before and after the revised code. In addition, ownership structure elements were found to have a negative relationship with either accounting or market performance measures, with institutional ownership showing a consistent negative impact on firm performance. Firm size and leverage, as control variables, were significant in determining corporate performance. Research limitations/implications - – One limitation is the use of separate measures of corporate governance attributes, as opposed to a corporate governance index (CGI). As a result, the study constructs a CGI based on the recommendations of the revised code and proposes for future research use. Practical implications - – Some of the largest companies did not even comply with basic requirements such as the “one-third INDs” mandatory requirement. Hence, the regulators may want to reinforce the requirements of the code and also detail examples of good governance practices. The results, which show a consistent positive relationship between the presence of an independent chairperson and firm performance in both data sets, suggest listed companies to consider appointing an independent chairperson in the corporate leadership. The regulatory authorities may also wish to note this phenomenon when drafting any future corporate governance codes. Originality/value - – This study offers new insights of the implications of regulatory changes on the relationship between corporate governance attributes and firm performance from the perspective of a developing country. The development of a CGI for future research is a novel approach of this study.