The influence of family and government-controlled firms on goodwill impairment

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure on the goodwill impairment policy of Malaysian listed firms. In particular, the authors test whether the direction and magnitude of goodwill impairment are related to whether firms are government or family controlled firms. Given the highly concentrated ownership of firms in Malaysia, the authors suggest that the “entrenchment effect” will take precedence over the “alignment effect”, which will be reflected in the accounting policy on goodwill valuation and impairment. Design/methodology/approach - – This study utilizes logistic and Tobit regressions to test the prediction, controlling for a range of factors that might affect the goodwill impairment decision. The data were manually collected through 579 firm-year observations from the financial reports of companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia web site for the period 2003-2009. Findings - – The authors find that family controlled firms are more likely to record goodwill impairment than non-family controlled firms. The results are, however, not significant in government-controlled firms. Similar evidence in prior studies finds that Malaysian firms are more likely to recognize and record higher goodwill impairment loss in their first year of adoption than in the subsequent years. Interestingly, in contrast to prior studies, longer chief executive officer (CEO) tenure is found to be positively associated with the likelihood to recognize and record higher impairment of goodwill. Originality/value - – This paper is one of few studies that examine the role of ownership structure on goodwill accounting policy choice where ownership structure is highly concentrated and government owned firms play a significant role in the economy. The paper also examines goodwill policy choice before, during the transition and subsequent to the adoption of the goodwill standard in Malaysia, which has not been addressed before.