IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eme/ijoemp/ijoem-08-2018-0423.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Central bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa

Author

Listed:
  • Abel Mawuko Agoba
  • Joshua Yindenaba Abor
  • Kofi Osei
  • Jarjisu Sa-Aadu
  • Benjamin Amoah
  • Gloria Clarissa Odortor Dzeha

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to primarily investigate the ability of independent central banks (central bank independence (CBI)) to improve fiscal performances in Africa, accounting for election years, and also to examine whether the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance is enhanced by higher political institutional quality. Design/methodology/approach - Using recent CBI data from Garriga (2016) on 48 African countries, 90 other developing countries and 40 developed countries over the period 1970–2012, the authors apply a two stage system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction estimator to examine the impact of CBI and elections on fiscal policy in Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Findings - The authors provide evidence that unlike in other developing countries and developed countries, CBI does not significantly improve fiscal performance in Africa. However, the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance in Africa is enhanced by higher levels of institutional quality. Although elections directly worsen fiscal performance in Africa, institutional quality enhances CBI’s effect on improving fiscal performance in election years across Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Practical implications - The findings of the study are significant as they provide insight into the benefits of having strong institutions to complement independent central banks in order to control fiscal indiscipline in election years. Originality/value - The study is the first among the studies of CBI-fiscal policy nexus, to measure fiscal policy using net central bank claims on government as a percentage of GDP. In addition to the use of fiscal balance, this study also uses cyclically adjusted fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal policy. This is a critical channel through which independent central banks can constrain government spending. It also compares findings in Africa to other developing countries, noting some differences.

Suggested Citation

  • Abel Mawuko Agoba & Joshua Yindenaba Abor & Kofi Osei & Jarjisu Sa-Aadu & Benjamin Amoah & Gloria Clarissa Odortor Dzeha, 2019. "Central bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa," International Journal of Emerging Markets, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 14(5), pages 809-830, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijoemp:ijoem-08-2018-0423
    DOI: 10.1108/IJOEM-08-2018-0423
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJOEM-08-2018-0423/full/html?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJOEM-08-2018-0423/full/pdf?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1108/IJOEM-08-2018-0423?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:ijoemp:ijoem-08-2018-0423. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emerald Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.