Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of government reward and punishment mechanisms and agricultural resilience under a dual carbon context

Purpose - Under the “dual carbon” framework, the article explores the equilibrium points among the government, agricultural enterprises and village committees, and uses sensitivity analysis to reveal the dynamic factors affecting these stakeholders, thereby proposing methods to enhance agricultural disaster resilience. Design/methodology/approach - The article uses MATLAB to construct a game model for the three parties with interests: agribusiness, government and village council. It examines the stability of strategies among these entities. Through graphical simulation, the paper analyzes the sensitivity of agricultural enterprises carbon emissions and village committees’ rent-seeking behaviors in the decision-making process, focusing on significant factors such as government carbon tax and regulatory policies. Findings - A single government reward and punishment mechanism is insufficient to influence the strategic choices of enterprises and village committees. The cost of rent-seeking does not affect the strategic choices of enterprises and village committees. A key factor influencing whether the village committee engages in rent-seeking is the level of labor income of the village committee as an “intermediary”. Originality/value - This paper focuses on the dynamic game between three stakeholders (the government, agricultural enterprises and village committees), seeking dynamic equilibrium and conducting sensitivity analysis through visualization to provide the government with optimal policy recommendations.