The contested instruments of a new governance regime

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyse the processes involved in the creation and eventual demise of a market for biodiversity offsets in the UK. The reasons for the failure of this market to take hold as a governance mechanism are considered, and its subsequent effects examined. Design/methodology/approach - The research examines a single case study of the creation of a pilot market for biodiversity offsets in the UK. Data include policy and industry papers, complemented with interviews with biodiversity offset practitioners, regulators and non-government organisations. Findings - The case study demonstrates that a market for biodiversity offsets was piloted with the intent to contribute to the reform of the UK planning regime. However, disagreements about this political project, uncertainties in the knowledge base, and continued entanglements with existing biodiversity meant it was impossible to stabilise the assemblages necessary to support the market, leading to its eventual demise. However, the principles and devices of offsetting have proved more resilient, and have started to combine with the existing arrangements for the governance of nature. Practical implications - The paper presents a situation where a political project to reform governance arrangements through the creation of a market was not successful, making it of interest to researchers and policymakers alike. Originality/value - While biodiversity offsetting has been widely discussed from scientific, legal and political perspectives, this paper addresses it as a market, explicitly designed to become a part of a governance regime. It also advances the understanding of the mechanisms by which similar processes of marketisation can fail, and suggests avenues for future research in those contexts.