Author
Listed:
- Begoña Giner
- Araceli Mora
Abstract
Purpose - The study aims to show how the public interest has been argued to justify the political interference in the accounting of financial entities as a tool to face a critical financial situation in a country. And to offer a different perspective of the publicness notion that focuses on the field of financial accounting for private entities. Design/methodology/approach - The paper draws on legal and political arguments referred to the public interest that consider the balancing approach, and so goes beyond the traditional agency framework, to explain politicians' influence on financial reporting. The behavior of the newly elected Spanish government, which issued accounting impairment rules for banks is described, and the accounting practices of a highly politically connected financial entity—Bankia—are used to illustrate the consequences of that intervention. Findings - The paper evidences that the government intervention, which implied non-compliance with IFRS, was in line with its economic goals, led to the financial sector bailout and avoided the rescue of the country. This is what we call “breaking rules to achieve the public interest”, which is also consistent with a big-bath behavior to justify the bailout and legitimate the decision to breach IFRS. The silence of enforcers is consistent with the balancing approach that suggests compliance costs from a breach of rules are perceived less relevant after a high-level decision. Research limitations/implications - This is a country-specific study based on a single case study that limits the generalizability of the findings. Originality/value - This research provides a new angle to consider the political motivations to intervene in accounting in the private sector, as well as the enforcers' motivations to allow it. From an interdisciplinary perspective, it shows how politicians have argued the “public interest” to use (and abuse) to intervene in accounting rules, as well as to influence the accounting practice of a highly politically connected bank. It also highlights the potential long-term unintended consequences of these actions.
Suggested Citation
Begoña Giner & Araceli Mora, 2020.
"Political interference in private entities' financial reporting and the public interest: evidence from the Spanish financial crisis,"
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 34(7), pages 1581-1607, September.
Handle:
RePEc:eme:aaajpp:aaaj-11-2019-4271
DOI: 10.1108/AAAJ-11-2019-4271
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:aaajpp:aaaj-11-2019-4271. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emerald Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.