Author
Abstract
The tax system combining a flat tax rate with an exempt minimum income has been largely debated in recent years. Detractors argue that tax systems with these characteristics are less progressive and, hence, they tend to lower the degree of redistribution. In contrast, supporters brandish its simplicity as one of its major advantages as simplicity leads to lower levels of both tax evasion and tax avoidance. This paper presents a framework in which I compare the tax compliance of the same taxpayer under two different tax structures: the one with a flat tax rate featuring a tax exempt income bracket and the one exhibiting increasing marginal tax rates. Provided the condition that in both tax structures the tax burden borne by an honest taxpayer is equivalent, I show that the income declared is higher under the tax structure for which the taxpayer faces a higher marginal rate.// El sistema impositivo que combina una única tasa impositiva con un mínimo exento ha sido objeto de largo debate en los años recientes. Sus detractores argumentan que los sistemas impositivos de estas características son menos progresivos y en consecuencia el grado de redistribución tenderá a ser menor. Por lo contrario, sus defensores esgrimen su sencillez como una de sus ventajas mayores, ya que la sencillez impositiva reduce las posibilidades de evasión y elusión fiscal. En este artículo presento un marco de análisis en el que comparo el cumplimiento fiscal de un mismo contribuyente con dos estructuras impositivas distintas: una de tarifa única con mínimo exento y otra de tasas marginales crecientes. Dada la condición de que en ambas estructuras impositivas la carga fiscal soportada por un contribuyente honesto sea equivalente, demuestro que la renta declarada será mayor con aquella estructura impositiva en la que el contribuyente se enfrente a un tasa marginal más alta.
Suggested Citation
Panadés, Judith, 2012.
"Tasa impositiva única y cumplimiento fiscal,"
El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(314), pages .311-332, abril-jun.
Handle:
RePEc:elt:journl:v:79:y:2012:i:314:p:311-332
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20430/ete.v79i314.62
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Keywords
evasión fiscal;
política fiscal.;
JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
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