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The neoclassical sink and the heterodox spiral: political divides and lines of communication in economics

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  • Gary A. Dymski

    (University of Leeds)

Abstract

A crisis that started as a textbook case of how financial and asset markets can spin out of control without adequate public oversight has transmuted in 5 years into a crisis of irresponsible sovereigns, such that restoring prosperity requires that governments re-establish control over their own excessive spending. How did this happen? This paper explains the recovery of position by pro-market, restricted-government proponents in economics on the basis of political divides and segmented lines of communication within the academic economics profession. These political divides involve a double invisibilization of power within economics: an invisibilization both of the political purposes served by a profession whose leading models deny the relevance of social and political power, and of the ideational barriers to entry into 'mainstream' departments. The argument is motivated and illustrated by the cases of the subprime and the eurozone crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary A. Dymski, 2014. "The neoclassical sink and the heterodox spiral: political divides and lines of communication in economics," Review of Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 2(1), pages 1-19, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:rokejn:v:2:y:2014:i:1:p1-19
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    eurozone crisis; subprime crisis; neoclassical and heterodox approaches to economics; power; political divide;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • B50 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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