Historia y diversidad. Un ensayo de filosofía económica

This article examines the philosophical implications of the use of some recent ideas in the Game Theory to the problem of the Autonomy of a Central Bank. The fact that the Autonomy of the Central Bank is not the only possible solution to the problem of the inflationary bias in an economic policy game between Government and Unions is expounded in the substantive part of the article. This inflationary bias may also disappear i) either because rationality, unlimited as it is, is not a matter of common knowledge within a dynamic version (in virtual time) of the game, ii) or because in an evolutionary version in real time (with a small limit attributed to rationality), the equilibrium of the game may not coincide with the Nash equilibrium. A philosophical reading of this problem, or other similar problems, allow us to appreciate the fact that Diversity is not contrary to the Universality of reason and that History may conform a legitimate explanation.