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Evaluación del Parlamento Vasco (1990-1994): Una aplicación de la teoría de juegos

Author

Listed:
  • Ana C. Mauleón

    (Dpto. de fundamentos del Analisis Económico. Universidad del Pais Vasco)

Abstract

Several are the indexes of power which are analyzed in this paper, which are subsequently applied to the Basque Parliament and to the Basque Provincial Administrations (Diputaciones) so as to measure the power wielded by each party in these institutions. This power is not proportional to the number of seats each party has. It depends rather more on the capacity of each party to have a decision adopted, which depends much more on how parliamentary seats are distributed amongst the remaining political parties. By means of such reasoning, I shall try to explain the rationality of the first coalition Basque Government which was set up after the 1990 elections and the reasons behind its break up after the 1991 Provincial Parliament (Juntas Generales) elections. This break up was the origin of the present Government. Finally the power indexes obtained for each of these Governments is contrastes with the real economical power of the various political parties which made up these governments in terms of budgetary allowances for the various government Departments administered by each of the parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana C. Mauleón, 1993. "Evaluación del Parlamento Vasco (1990-1994): Una aplicación de la teoría de juegos," EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, Gobierno Vasco / Eusko Jaurlaritza / Basque Government, vol. 25(01), pages 166-185.
  • Handle: RePEc:ekz:ekonoz:1993110
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    poder político; poder económico; teoría de juegos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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