IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ejw/journl/v1y2004i1p19-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Response to Tabarrok

Author

Listed:
  • Margaret M. Byrne
  • Peter Thompson

Abstract

EVERY GRADUATE OF PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS LEARNS THAT supply curves slope upwards. But most of them quickly forget the assumptions that make this so. Some may recall that a perfectly competitive market of identical firms yields a horizontal long-run supply curve. Others may recall that monopolists don’t have one at all. Relatively few will recall the obvious, but usually implicit, assumption that payment for goods and services supplied are actually made to those who create the supply. In Byrne and Thompson (2001), we made this trivial idea the cornerstone of an analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation.

Suggested Citation

  • Margaret M. Byrne & Peter Thompson, 2004. "Response to Tabarrok," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 1(1), pages 19-25, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:1:y:2004:i:1:p:19-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econjwatch.org/File+download/18/2004-04-byrnethompson-com.pdf?mimetype=pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://econjwatch.org/154
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Byrne, Margaret M. & Thompson, Peter, 2001. "A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 69-83, January.
    2. Byrne, Margaret M. & Thompson, Peter, 2000. "Death and dignity: Terminal illness and the market for non-treatment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 263-294, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jon Diesel, 2010. "Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Organ Liberalization?," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 7(3), pages 320-336, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Byrne, Margaret M. & Thompson, Peter, 2001. "Screening and preventable illness," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 1077-1088, November.
    2. Kessler, Daniel P. & McClellan, Mark B., 2004. "Advance directives and medical treatment at the end of life," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 111-127, January.
    3. Bruhin, Adrian & Goette, Lorenz & Haenni, Simon & Jiang, Lingqing, 2020. "Spillovers of prosocial motivation: Evidence from an intervention study on blood donors," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    4. Wilson, Nicholas, 2018. "Altruism in preventive health behavior: At-scale evidence from the HIV/AIDS pandemic," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 119-129.
    5. Howard, David H., 2002. "Why do transplant surgeons turn down organs?: A model of the accept/reject decision," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 957-969, November.
    6. Abadie, Alberto & Gay, Sebastien, 2006. "The impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric organ donation: A cross-country study," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 599-620, July.
    7. Nejat Anbarci & Mustafa Caglayan, 2005. "Cadaveric Vs. Live-Donor Kidney Transplants: The Interaction Of Institutions And Inequality," Working Papers 2005_25, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    8. Manfred Tietzel, 2001. "In Praise of the Commons: Another Case Study," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 159-171, November.
    9. Mocan, Naci & Tekin, Erdal, 2007. "The determinants of the willingness to donate an organ among young adults: Evidence from the United States and the European Union," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 65(12), pages 2527-2538, December.
    10. Naci Mocan & Erdal Tekin, 2005. "The Determinants of the Willingness to be an Organ Donor," NBER Working Papers 11316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario & Stith, Sarah S., 2014. "Removing financial barriers to organ and bone marrow donation: The effect of leave and tax legislation in the U.S," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 43-56.
    12. David H. Howard, 2007. "Producing Organ Donors," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 25-36, Summer.
    13. Byrne, Margaret M. & Thompson, Peter, 2001. "A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 69-83, January.
    14. Eyting, Markus & Hosemann, Arne & Johannesson, Magnus, 2016. "Can monetary incentives increase organ donations?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 56-58.
    15. Fırat Bilgel, 2012. "The impact of presumed consent laws and institutions on deceased organ donation," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 13(1), pages 29-38, February.
    16. Deck, Cary & Kimbrough, Erik O., 2013. "Do market incentives crowd out charitable giving?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 16-24.
    17. Asheim,G.B. & Emblem,A.W. & Nilssen,T., 2000. "Health insurance : treatment vs. compensation," Memorandum 40/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    18. Bilgel, Fırat, 2013. "The effectiveness of transplant legislation, procedures and management: Cross-country evidence," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 229-242.
    19. Chan, Leo & Lien, Donald, 2010. "The value of planned death," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 692-695, December.
    20. Jon Diesel, 2010. "Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Organ Liberalization?," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 7(3), pages 320-336, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ejw:journl:v:1:y:2004:i:1:p:19-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jason Briggeman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edgmuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.