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Iterated prisoner’s dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors

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  • Castro, Laureano
  • Toro, Miguel A.

Abstract

Cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals can arise when pairs of individuals interact repeatedly in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, the conditions allowing the evolution of reciprocal cooperation become extremely restrictive as the size of the cooperative group increases, because defectors can exploit cooperators more efficiently in larger groups. Here we consider three strategies: Tit for Tat, defector, and loner. Loner beats defector in a non-cooperative world. However, a cooperative strategy Tit for Tat (TFT0) that stops cooperation after the first iteration when there is at least one defector in the group, can invade a world of loners, even in sizable groups, if both the TFT0 and the defector strategies arise at the same frequency by mutation.

Suggested Citation

  • Castro, Laureano & Toro, Miguel A., 2008. "Iterated prisoner’s dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:74:y:2008:i:1:p:1-5
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2008.04.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Karl Sigmund & Christoph Hauert & Arne Traulsen & Hannelore Silva, 2011. "Social Control and the Social Contract: The Emergence of Sanctioning Systems for Collective Action," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 149-171, March.
    2. Francesca Pancotto & Simone Righi & Károly Takács, 2023. "Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 405-428, October.

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