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Spread of costly prestige-seeking behavior by social learning

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  • Ihara, Yasuo

Abstract

Mathematical and simulation models of cultural transmission in a population where individuals may differ in their social status are developed. High-status individuals are assumed to be more influential to others but no more fertile or viable than low-status individuals. Analysis of the models suggests that culturally transmitted values, beliefs, and preferences that cause individuals to engage in prestige-seeking behavior can sometimes invade the population, even if that behavior reduces the net reproductive success of the prestige seekers. It is argued that some of the seemingly maladaptive behaviors observed in human societies may be a result of cultural evolution based on the human capacity for social learning, rather than a product of the “time lag†before the evolutionary modification of the human predisposition in response to the recent drastic changes in the environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Ihara, Yasuo, 2008. "Spread of costly prestige-seeking behavior by social learning," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 148-157.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:73:y:2008:i:1:p:148-157
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2007.10.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Alden Smith & Rebecca Bliege Bird & Douglas W. Bird, 2003. "The benefits of costly signaling: Meriam turtle hunters," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 14(1), pages 116-126, January.
    2. Marcus W. Feldman & Kenichi Aoki & Jochen Kumm, 1996. "Individual Versus Social Learning: Evolutionary Analysis in a Fluctuating Environment," Working Papers 96-05-030, Santa Fe Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. Takahashi, Takuya & Ihara, Yasuo, 2019. "Cultural and evolutionary dynamics with best-of-k learning when payoffs are uncertain," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 27-38.
    2. Kandler, Anne & Laland, Kevin N., 2009. "An investigation of the relationship between innovation and cultural diversity," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 59-67.
    3. Nakahashi, Wataru, 2010. "Evolution of learning capacities and learning levels," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 211-224.
    4. Vanderelst, Dieter & Ahn, René M.C. & Barakova, Emilia I., 2009. "Simulated Trust: A cheap social learning strategy," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 189-196.

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