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Informative inducement: Study payment as a signal of risk

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  • Cryder, Cynthia E.
  • John London, Alex
  • Volpp, Kevin G.
  • Loewenstein, George

Abstract

In research involving human subjects, large participation payments often are deemed undesirable because they may provide 'undue inducement' for potential participants to expose themselves to risk. However, although large incentives may encourage participation, they also may signal the riskiness of a study's procedures. In three experiments, we measured people's interest in participating in potentially risky research studies, and their perception of the risk associated with those studies, as functions of participation payment amounts. All experiments took place 2007-2008 with an on-line nationwide sample or a sample from a northeastern U.S. city. We tested whether people judge studies that offer higher participation payments to be riskier, and, if so, whether this increased perception of risk increases time and effort spent learning about the risks. We found that high participation payments increased willingness to participate, but, consistent with the idea that people infer riskiness from payment amount, high payments also increased perceived risk and time spent viewing risk information. Moreover, when a link between payment amount and risk level was made explicit in Experiment 3, the relationship between high payments and perceived risk strengthened. Research guidelines usually prohibit studies from offering participation incentives that compensate for risks, yet these experiments' results indicate that potential participants naturally assume that the magnitude of risks and incentives are related. This discrepancy between research guidelines and participants' assumptions about those guidelines has implications for informed consent in human subjects research.

Suggested Citation

  • Cryder, Cynthia E. & John London, Alex & Volpp, Kevin G. & Loewenstein, George, 2010. "Informative inducement: Study payment as a signal of risk," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 455-464, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:70:y:2010:i:3:p:455-464
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christina Leuker & Lasare Samartzidis & Ralph Hertwig & Timothy J Pleskac, 2020. "When money talks: Judging risk and coercion in high-paying clinical trials," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, January.
    2. Xinrui Zhang & Tom Lane, 2022. "The backfiring effects of monetary and gift incentives on Covid-19 vaccination willingness," Discussion Papers 2022-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Chowdury, Sadia & Vergeer, Petra & Schmidt, Harald & Barroy, Helene & Bishai, David & Halpern, Scott, 2013. "Economics and Ethics of Results-Based Financing for Family Planning: Evidence and Policy Implications," Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper Series 84663, The World Bank.
    4. Mantzari, Eleni & Vogt, Florian & Marteau, Theresa M., 2014. "Does incentivising pill-taking ‘crowd out’ risk-information processing? Evidence from a web-based experiment," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 75-82.
    5. Sandro Ambuehl, 2017. "An Offer You Can't Refuse? Testing Undue Inducement," CESifo Working Paper Series 6296, CESifo.
    6. Marta Serra-Garcia & Nora Szech, 2023. "Incentives and Defaults Can Increase COVID-19 Vaccine Intentions and Test Demand," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 1037-1049, February.

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