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Choice as justification for dishonesty

Author

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  • Klimm, Felix
  • Loipersberger, Florian

Abstract

In this paper, we set up a laboratory experiment to study whether dishonesty is affected by the presence of a choice. In particular, a participant has the choice to self-select into an interaction in which a potential liar can lie at his expense. As a consequence, the potential liar might excuse his dishonesty with the following self-serving justification. The other participant could have averted the lie by deciding against the interaction and thus is responsible for the outcome. We find that the introduction of a choice does not significantly increase the probability of dishonest behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Klimm, Felix & Loipersberger, Florian, 2019. "Choice as justification for dishonesty," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 185-194.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:81:y:2019:i:c:p:185-194
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.06.006
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lying; Choice; Justification; Laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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