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Alternative routes of political change: Elites fracture or social mobilization, economic incentives or cultural thresholds

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  • Castañeda, Gonzalo

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of political change that combines structural and strategic elements which determine elites' degree of fragmentation with cultural factors that exert an influence on the cohesiveness of civil society. Therefore, political change is seen as an outcome of modifications in the bargaining positions of these two segments of society which, in turn, are transformed through economic dynamics and the propagation of certain cultural variants. With evolutionary theorizing and bounded rationality, it is possible to explain the co-evolution of socioeconomic variables, as well as the importance of the historical legacy in establishing different routes of political change.

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  • Castañeda, Gonzalo, 2011. "Alternative routes of political change: Elites fracture or social mobilization, economic incentives or cultural thresholds," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 178-191, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:178-191
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-293, March.
    2. Guido Tabellini, 2010. "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 677-716, June.
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    6. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
    7. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
    9. Eckstein, Harry, 1988. "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(3), pages 789-804, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesc Trillas Jané, 2016. "Behavioral Regulatory Agencies," Working Papers wpdea1606, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.

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