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Institutions matter: The case of Vietnam

Author

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  • Tran, Thi Bich
  • Grafton, R. Quentin
  • Kompas, Tom

Abstract

The paper investigates institutional reforms in Vietnam and their impact on the economic performance of firms. Using the provincial competitiveness index 2006 (PCI06) and firm-level data in Vietnam in 2005, the results show that provincial competitiveness is economically and statistically significant in explaining cross-province differences in firm performance. We find that a 1% point improvement in government practice could increase the daily value-added of an average firm by an amount equivalent to nearly three times per capita GDP per day. The results show that an improvement in providing market information, more secure land tenure and labor training assistance has a positive effect on firm performance. By contrast, weaknesses in the judiciary system and administrative reforms impede growth of non-state firms. The findings indicate that governance is an important obstacle to the development of the non-state sector in Vietnam.

Suggested Citation

  • Tran, Thi Bich & Grafton, R. Quentin & Kompas, Tom, 2009. "Institutions matter: The case of Vietnam," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:38:y:2009:i:1:p:1-12
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institution Transition Property rights Non-state firm;

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • N01 - Economic History - - General - - - Development of the Discipline: Historiographical; Sources and Methods
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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