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Increased cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas: Can it be explained by risk sharing?

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  • Vesely, Stepan
  • Wengström, Erik

Abstract

A potential mechanism to explain changes in cooperativeness in the presence of risk may be opportunities for informal risk sharing. Using a novel experimental design, we show that the presence of both independent and correlated risk prevents the typical decay of cooperation in a laboratory social dilemma game. Notably, this result seems to rule out risk sharing as a possible mechanism behind the cooperation increase. Exploratory analyses tentatively suggest that behavior consistent with a risk sharing account may emerge late in the game, congruent with previous theorizing of slow learning in stochastic environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Vesely, Stepan & Wengström, Erik, 2025. "Increased cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas: Can it be explained by risk sharing?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:114:y:2025:i:c:s2214804324001460
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102309
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