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Coordination in stag hunt games

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  • Silva, Rui

Abstract

Stag hunt games display a tension between a payoff superior option (stag) and a less risky but payoff inferior alternative (hare). We explore that tension by proposing a selection criterion (which we denote as relative salience) where subjects choose to coordinate in one option by comparing the salience of stag’s main aspect (its payoff) to the salience of hare’s main aspect (its risk) by accounting for both payoff-relevant factors and unobservable individual-specific (idiosyncratic) preferences. Using data from 10 experiments, we find that this criterion is a significant determinant of individual choices in stag-hunt games, outperforming other selection methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Silva, Rui, 2024. "Coordination in stag hunt games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:113:y:2024:i:c:s2214804324001277
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102290
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    Keywords

    Equilibrium selection; Coordination; Relative salience; Stag hunt game; Risk dominance; Payoff dominance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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