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Parent company board reform and subsidiary optimization of cash holdings: A quasi-natural experiment from central state-owned enterprises in China

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  • Yu, Yao
  • Jia, Xiaoxiao
  • Qi, Huaijin

Abstract

This study finds that board reform of parent companies in central state-owned enterprise (SOE) groups in China has significantly optimized the cash holdings of subsidiaries, which is reflected in reducing the level of cash redundancy and cash shortage. Moreover, the optimization function manifests mainly in moderate pyramid hierarchy samples, longer geographic distance samples, and fewer vertical interlocks of executive samples between the parent company and subsidiaries. In addition, we examine whether the mechanism for optimizing cash holdings alleviates agency problems, reduces government intervention, and promotes power delegation. Board reform also improves corporate value by optimizing cash holdings. We argue that board reform of parent companies in SOE groups helps alleviate problems caused by the absence of owners, and it reconstructs the power relationship between the government and SOEs. It also facilitates SOEs making reasonable and market-oriented cash holding decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu, Yao & Jia, Xiaoxiao & Qi, Huaijin, 2023. "Parent company board reform and subsidiary optimization of cash holdings: A quasi-natural experiment from central state-owned enterprises in China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:66:y:2023:i:c:s0275531923001848
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State versus Private Ownership," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 133-150, Fall.
    2. Mazur, Mieszko & Salganik-Shoshan, Galla & Walker, Thomas & Wang, Jun, 2018. "Proximity and litigation: Evidence from the geographic location of institutional investors," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 60-74.
    3. Qi Chen & Xiao Chen & Katherine Schipper & Yongxin Xu & Jian Xue, 2012. "The Sensitivity of Corporate Cash Holdings to Corporate Governance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(12), pages 3610-3644.
    4. Xie, Jun & Zhang, Yifan, 2020. "Anti-corruption, government intervention, and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(1).
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Ruiyuan (Ryan) & Liu, Feiyu (Andy) & Zhao, Chen, 2024. "Worldwide board reforms and financial reporting quality," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Board reform; Cash holding; Controlling shareholder governance; Government intervention; Delegation of power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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